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AN ASSESSMENT OF CROSS-NATIONAL 
REGULATORY BURDEN COMPARISONS 
Thomas D. Hopkins∗ 
Governments everywhere engage in activities that impose burdens on 
individuals and businesses.  These activities are undertaken in order to 
generate benefits of many types.  Some of these burdens and benefits are 
readily measurable, particularly those taking the form of financial 
transactions, such as taxes and fees collected.  Such payments are routinely 
and closely monitored, in ways permitting comparisons among countries.  
National rankings have been available for many years that are based on 
government revenues in the aggregate and relative to population, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and other metrics. 
While payments by individuals and business to their governments are the 
most visible and generally largest form of governmental burden, mandated 
behavior catalogued in regulations also imposes a burden by requiring a 
substantial expenditure of time and resources.1  Any portrayal of 
governmental burden that ignores regulatory compliance costs is 
misleading, particularly since governments are, to a considerable degree,  
able to achieve objectives through varying mixes of fiscal and regulatory 
measures.  A government, for example, can construct a water filtration 
plant using tax revenues, or require businesses to use their own funds to 
construct it.2 
Traditionally, far more public attention has been focused on fiscal 
burden than on regulatory burden, largely due to the transparency of 
 
∗
 Professor of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, N.Y.  The author 
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 1. See infra notes 5-11, 28-94 and accompanying text (detailing the burden of 
regulatory compliance throughout the world). 
 2. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination: System B Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control 
Program Addressing Storm Water Discharge, promulgated in 1999, “expands the existing 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program for storm water control.”  U.S. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGUL. AFFAIRS, VALIDATING 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 
145 (2005).  The EPA estimates that this rule will impose a “total cost . . . on Federal and 
State levels of government, and on the private sector, [of] $803.1 million annually.”  Id. 
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budgetary transactions.  This is not surprising given the fragmented nature 
of regulation, which arises independently in dozens of separate 
governmental agencies and units.  The importance of rectifying this 
imbalance, and making the public more fully aware of regulatory burden, 
has been  underscored by a Canadian finding that “recent research, 
particularly from the OECD, and better data on regulations, point to strong 
and almost always negative links between the economic restrictiveness or 
burden of the regulations and economic performance.”3  Similarly, a World 
Bank working paper from 2005 concludes that “a heavier regulatory burden 
reduces growth and increases [macroeconomic] volatility.”4 
Of course, any portrayal of governmental activity that ignores whatever 
benefits it may produce is incomplete, whether the action is a spending 
program or a regulatory program.  Unfortunately, sufficient 
characterizations of such benefits exist neither for  fiscal actions nor for 
regulatory actions.  The fundamental question of whether the net effect of 
particular governmental activities enhances societal well-being is rarely 
answered adequately, either prospectively or retrospectively. 
As for spending programs, an implicit reckoning exists, in that 
government must finance its spending, putting in place a political and 
financial constraint, the effectiveness of which varies over time and across 
jurisdictions.5  No such inherent constraint exists, however, for regulatory 
programs, which explains the rise in many countries of alternative 
oversight mechanisms such as benefit-cost analytical requirements.6  Such 
oversight mechanisms are used with varying success to supplement 
whatever legislative review procedures may apply to both particular 
spending and regulatory programs.7  The United States has made more 
 
 3. Fidele Ndayisenga & Andre Downs, Economic Impacts of Regulatory Convergence 
Between Canada and the United States 3 (Gov’t of Can., Working Paper Series 008, 2005). 
 4. Norman V. Loayza et al., Regulation and Macroeconomic Performance 1 (World 
Bank, Working Paper No. 3469, 2004); see id. at Part 18. 
 5. See W. MARK CRAIN, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS 
ON SMALL FIRMS 1-4 (2005). 
 6. See generally U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 2 (providing the costs 
and benefits of Federal regulations and recommendations for regulatory reforms); see also 
AUSTRALIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUS., HOLDING BACK THE RED TAPE 
AVALANCHE: A REGULATORY REFORM AGENDA FOR AUSTRALIA 7 (2005). The Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), an organization whose membership includes 
federal business organizations as well as major national industry associations in Australia, 
proposed, as one of its suggested improvements of regulation cost, a regulatory budgeting 
system whereby “[e]ach year the Prime Minister will present a regulatory budget that is a 
compendium of the cost and benefit analysis of regulations enacted by government and 
departments in the previous year.” Id. The ACCI also recognized that “[r]igorous 
cost/benefit analysis of regulation is a fundamental component of the . . . process.” Id. 
 7. See CRAIN, supra note 5, at 2-3 (discussing limiting characteristics of using cost-
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headway than other nations in bringing benefit-cost principles to bear on 
regulatory decision making, thanks to efforts of units within the Executive 
Office of the President that have continued for over three decades.8  The 
lead role on that front is now being taken by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), as detailed in its December 2005 report.9 
Some estimates of overall regulatory compliance cost do exist for a few 
countries, but they are less widely available and considerably less 
standardized than are estimates of taxes and fees.10  Regulatory cost 
estimates have been generated for the United States Government,11 and to a 
much lesser extent for the governments of other countries.  Estimates are 
essentially non-existent for regulatory costs generated by units of 
government other than at the national level.  Countries vary substantially in 
the mix of responsibilities carried out by the central government, as distinct 
from regional units such as states and provincial governments.  Thus, 
comparing compliance cost estimates across nations is replete with 
challenges—comprehensive data simply do not exist, and such data as can 
be assembled lack comparability due to varying patterns of federalism. 
In recent years, various comparisons across countries that are based on a 
mix of “hard” statistics on narrowly-defined elements of regulation, 
coupled with qualitative judgments, have become available.12 This Article 
reviews such comparisons as proxies for regulatory burden measures. The 
several rankings differ in scope and features, so it may be useful to precede 
their review with some discussion of just what it is that regulation 
encompasses. 
Traditionally, the term “regulation” has generally been used to refer to 
three clusters of governmental influence over the conduct of individuals 
and businesses: antitrust policy, economic controls (constraints on business 
entry/exit from markets and on product prices and quantities sold), and 
health/safety/environmental safeguards (often termed “social” 
regulation).13  This three-part categorization, for example, is the organizing 
 
benefit analysis for assessing regulatory policy). 
 8. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 2, at 19-34. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. at 1, 3-34 (summarizing cost-benefit analytical review of eighty-eight 
“major” Federal regulations); see also AUSTRALIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUS., 
supra note 6, at 15 (providing overall regulatory costs for Australia during the 2004 fiscal 
year); MARC A. MILES ET AL., 2006 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (2006) (providing  a 
statistical analysis for regulatory schemes in 161 countries over twelve years); Ndayisenga 
& Downs, supra note 3 (reviewing regulatory reform in Canada). 
 11. The most recent such estimates are those found in CRAIN, supra note 5, at 1 
(estimating the total cost of federal regulation at between $34 billion and $39 billion). 
 12. See infra notes 28-95 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (4th 
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framework of major textbooks such as that of Viscusi, Harrington and 
Vernon.14  Their text identifies two mechanisms—price incentives 
(primarily taxes) and direct controls on behavior—used by both the federal 
and state governments within the United States to achieve objectives in 
each of the three regulatory areas.15  In effect, this calls for a twelve-cell 
matrix of regulation (three types, two enforcers, and two tools), and on at 
least one dimension, that of the enforcer, numerous agencies populate the 
“economic” and “social” cells of the matrix.16  Chart 1 illustrates what such 
a framework entails; total regulatory burden would be the sum of the 
heights of the twelve columns (heights shown here are purely 
hypothetical).17  As will become clear in reviewing existing burden 
measures, few studies attempt to encompass all twelve, and most confine 
their reach to merely two—direct controls by the federal government in 
“economic” and “social” areas.18 
CHART 1: TYPES OF REGULATION—A CONCEPTUAL VIEW.   
THE HEIGHT OF A COLUMN WOULD REPRESENT THE TOTAL BURDEN 
ASSOCIATED WITH A PARTICULAR TYPE OF REGULATION. 
 
If one wanted to work with a conceptualization that captures total 
government burden, the fiscal dimension would need to be incorporated, 
covering revenues raised in ways unrelated to the price incentive 
mechanism identified by the Viscusi text.19  Then it would be important to 
include both the actual revenues generated and the compliance burden 
associated with their generation.  That modification would add another four 
columns.  The compliance burden of federal taxation, in the form of the 
time taxpayers devote to preparing tax forms, has been included in some 
estimates.20 
It is probably fair to say that the typology of regulation is in flux.  The 
approach taken by Crain organizes regulation into four clusters: economic, 
workplace, environmental, and tax compliance, while excluding antitrust.21  
 
ed. 2005). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 3.
 
 16. See Chart 1, infra p. __. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See infra notes 28-93 and accompanying text. 
 19. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 13. 
 20. See, e.g., CRAIN, supra note 5, at 27-28. 
 21. Id. at 5. 
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Crain finds that these clusters account for, respectively, roughly fifty-three, 
ten, twenty and eighteen percent of total federal regulatory burden in the 
United States22 
An alternative framework that is becoming increasingly common, with 
encouragement from the OMB and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) among others, distinguishes product 
market regulation from labor market regulation, with mixed practice as to 
whether antitrust is treated as part of the former (as in OECD reports) or 
simply excluded from consideration (as in OMB reports).23  A similar 
possibility is to apportion all regulation into clusters of “fiscal, labor and 
output market, where the latter encompasses the regulation of entry, trade, 
financial markets, bankruptcy and contract enforcement.”24  One pragmatic 
appeal of this latter approach is that particular national ranking indices 
falling within each cluster do appear to be more closely correlated with one 
another than with those in the other two clusters.25 
Were a tax compliance cluster to be included, it should reckon with 
those government rules put in place for the purpose of implementing 
government spending and revenue programs, occasioning real resource 
transfers from or to targeted individuals and businesses over and above the 
actual budgetary transaction itself.  OMB’s 2005 report identifies a variety 
of such regulations that implement federal budgetary programs, which it 
terms “transfer rules,” and it excludes the costs of these regulations from its 
overall calculations.26  OMB makes a “distinction between rules that 
impose costs primarily through the imposition of taxes, and rules that 
impose costs primarily through mandates on the private sector,” and OMB 
estimates only cover the latter type of regulation.27 
PROMINENT CURRENT RANKINGS OF NATIONAL REGULATORY 
BURDEN 
Five independent organizations have recently published country burden 
rankings using data drawn from 2003 to 2005.  The array of countries 
covered by each study ranges from 30 to 161.  While each study 
prominently features regulation, the five rankings vary with respect to how 
a regulatory burden is assessed and in the extent to which factors other than 
 
 22. Id. at 29. 
 23. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 34. 
 24. NORMAN V. LOAYZA ET AL., WORLD BANK, REGULATION AND MACROECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 19, 29 (2004). 
 25. Id. at  10. 
 26. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 16. 
 27. Id. at 16-17. 
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regulation are incorporated.  Each of the five ranking systems is discussed 
in turn. 
1) OECD: Product Market Regulation Indicator28 
The focus of the OECD indicator is on product market regulation as 
assessed by governmental officials in each of the thirty OECD member 
nations, using an OECD questionnaire.29  The OECD administered one 
questionnaire in 1998 and a second at the end of 2003.30 (The other four 
rankings reviewed in this paper are updated annually.)  The 2003 
questionnaire collected approximately 800 data points ranging across 
nearly 140 economy-wide or industry-specific regulatory areas, which were 
converted into sixteen numerical indicators.31  These were then aggregated 
into three clusters—extent of state control (weighted .29), barriers to 
entrepreneurship (.30), and barriers to trade and investment (.41)—and then 
to a single indicator of each country’s overall product market regulatory 
burden.32  Antitrust was taken into account along with all economic 
regulation.  While “administrative regulation” was included, it would 
appear that little of the burden from health/safety/environmental (social, 
labor market) regulation was covered.33 
According to the OECD findings for 2003, the countries with the least 
burdensome regulatory systems are the United Kingdom, Australia, the 
United States, New Zealand, Canada, Iceland, and Denmark.34  The most 
burdensome systems are in Poland, Turkey, Mexico, Hungary, Greece, 
Italy, Czech Republic, and France.35  The indices, scaled from zero to four, 
however, vary only slightly across most countries; all but five of the thirty 
countries have indices in the range 1.0 to 2.0. 36  The OECD pointed out 
that the differences across half the countries lack statistical significance.37 
OECD further noted that: (a) product market regulatory burden declined 
in all OECD member countries from 1998 to 2003,38 (b) most regulatory 
 
 28. Paul Conway et al., Product Market Regulation in OECD Countries: 1998 to 2003, 
3 (Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev., Working Paper No. 419, ECO/WKP, 2005), available at 
www.oecd.org/eco. 
 29. See id. at 3. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. at 5-7. 
 32. See id. at 8. 
 33. Id. at 59. 
 34. Id. at 23 fig.10. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 32 (“Regulatory impediments to product market competition have declined in 
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regimes became more homogeneous across countries,39 and (c) country 
rankings changed little during the five-year period.40  Finally, in OECD’s 
view, available evidence on labor market regulation suggests that similar 
patterns probably exist in both these classes of regulation.41  The declining 
burden pattern from 1998 to 2003 noted by OECD stands in sharp contrast 
to Crain’s finding that the United States federal regulatory burden, 
expressed on a per household basis, rose significantly from 1995 to 2004, 
from $8,437 to $10,172.42 
2) World Bank: Ease of Doing Business Indicator43 
The World Bank collected data for January 2005 from some 150 
countries on ten specific regulatory factors that bear on the ease of doing 
business.44  This was the third annual such World Bank survey, each of 
which was somewhat broader than its predecessor.45  The process entailed 
consultation with over 3,500 individuals drawn from within and outside 
governments.46  The World Bank concluded that “a high ranking on the 
ease of doing business does mean that the government has created a 
regulatory environment conducive to business operations.”47 Each 
country’s ranking is a simple average of its percentile rankings on each of 
the ten components, weighted equally.  The ten components are the 
strength of investor protection and the ease of: (1) starting a business, (2) 
hiring and firing, (3) licensing, (4) registering property, (5) getting credit, 
(6) paying taxes, (7) trading across borders, (8) enforcing contracts, and (9) 
closing a business.48 
These components relate primarily to the nature of economic regulation, 
but they also incorporate some elements to encompass investor protection 
and tax compliance simplicity.  The rankings are not strictly based on 
regulation; they represent informed opinion on particular indicators, 
distinct from any estimation of overall regulatory costs.49  What the World 
Bank rankings lose in comprehensiveness they gain in comparability across 
 
the OECD area.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 26. 
 42. See CRAIN, supra note 5, at 48. 
 43. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2006: CREATING JOBS (2006). 
 44. See id. at 77 (2006). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 92. 
 48. Id. at 93. 
 49. Id. at 91. 
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countries. 
The World Bank concluded that the greatest ease of doing business can 
be found in New Zealand, Singapore, the United States, Canada and 
Norway.50  At the other end of the spectrum, conditions are least conducive 
to business in five African countries.51 
3) World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Index52 
The intent of the annual Global Competitiveness Report set of rankings 
is to highlight competitiveness characteristics of countries, combining basic 
socioeconomic statistics with results of opinion surveys.53  The latest 
edition, providing data as of mid-2005, covers 117 countries.54  In all, 139 
different indicators are presented, grouped into nine broad classes.  These 
are aggregated into a single Global Competitiveness Index for each 
country. 55 
Burden of government regulation is one of the 139 indicators, but more 
than a dozen other indicators also address regulatory burden.56  The 
rankings for all but two of the regulation-related indicators are wholly 
driven by the opinion survey, as distinct from hard statistics.57  
Approximately 10,000 senior business executives worldwide, on average 
ninety-four per country, completed a 150-item questionnaire during the 
spring of 2005.58  In each country, a partner organization saw to the 
implementation of the survey; in the United States, this organization was 
the Council on Competitiveness.59  The burden of government regulation 
ranking reflects responses to the following: “Complying with 
administrative requirements (permits, regulations, reporting) issued by the 
government in your country is (1=burdensome, 7=not burdensome).”60  By 
that measure, the five least regulation-burdened countries (whose scores 
were in the 4.5 to 5.4 range of the scale) were Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 92. The five African nations are Sudan, Chad, Central African Republic, 
Burkina Fasa, and Congo Democratic Republic. 
 52. AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CLAROS ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005-2006 (2005). 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. Id. at 28-29. 
 55. Id. at 469-72. 
 56. Id. at 471-72. 
 57. Id. at 213-25. 
 58. Id. at 213-15.  One hundred and fifty-eight U.S. business executives completed the 
survey.  Id. 
 59. Id. at ix, 215. 
 60. Id. at 556, tbl.6.07. 
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Malaysia, Taiwan, and Finland.61  The U.S. ranked twentieth with a 3.6 
score; Canada ranked twenty-ninth with 3.4.  The five most regulation-
burdened countries (whose scores were in the 2.0-2.1 range) were Italy, 
Peru, Brazil, Serbia & Montenegro, and Bosnia & Herzegovina.62 
The World Economic Forum report sheds additional light on regulatory 
burden, as each of the following indicators suggests.63  (Ranks are shown 
only for the U.S. and Canada.) 
TABLE 1: WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM RANKINGS AMONG 117 NATIONS64 
[1 IS MOST FAVORABLE] 
 
EXCEPT WHERE NOTED, ALL RANKINGS ARE SURVEY-BASED. U.S.  CANADA  
Prevalence of trade barriers 28 25 
Impact of rules on FDI  10 42 
Agricultural policy costs  52 50 
Ease of hiring foreign labor  64 67 
Efficiency of legal framework   17 20 
Property rights   2 18 
Intellectual property protection 1 16 
Favoritism in decisions of government officials  33 45 
Extent of bureaucratic red tape  35 24 
Effectiveness of national lawmaking bodies 9 14 
Effectiveness of antitrust policy 6 12 
Demanding regulatory standards (other than environmental)  5 15 
Number of procedures required to start a business—World Bank report 10 1 
Time required to start a business—World Bank report 4 2 
Foreign ownership restrictions 14 25 
Strength of auditing and accounting standards  2 16 
Stringency of environmental regulations 19 16 
Clarity and stability of environmental regulations 17 14 
Extent of government-mandated environmental reporting  9 14 
Effects of environmental compliance on business 11 19 
Effects of privatization on competition and the environment 11 14 
 
It is difficult to discern a meaningful pattern in these results, which may 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 486-89, 528, 551-59, 579, 611-12, 616-20. 
 64. The author compiled this data from the World Economic Forum report. 
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mean that regulatory structures vary sharply, at least as they are perceived 
across countries. 
The survey instrument also provided an opportunity for respondents in 
each country to select, from a list of fourteen, the five most “problematic 
factors for doing business.”65 In the United States, three regulatory matters 
are among the most troublesome five: tax regulations, inefficient 
government bureaucracy, and restrictive labor regulations.66 
At the most aggregate level of the indices, the “Global Competitiveness 
Index,” the highest ranked five countries are the United States, Finland, 
Denmark, Switzerland and Singapore.67  The worst rankings are assigned to 
Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi and East Timor.  Canada’s rank is number 
thirteen.68 
The World Economic Forum’s approach has the virtue of exploring 
many different facets of the business setting in a large array of countries, 
attempting to rely upon comparable constructs in each.  It demonstrates 
how difficult it is to distinguish regulatory concerns from other concerns; 
regulatory benefits and burdens are in some instances construed on a net 
benefit (or net burden) basis, and in others just the burden is referenced.  
While the survey approach has much merit, it is not clear that tracking the 
views of 158 U.S. business executives (and generally fewer in other 
countries) about diverse regulatory issues yields reliable results, 
particularly when individual perceptions can be colored by unique cultural 
and historical factors. 
4) Heritage/Wall Street Journal: Index of Economic Freedom69 
The Index of Economic Freedom is an annual assessment of how 161 
countries compare on fifty indicators that are grouped into ten “factors” of 
economic freedom.70  One of the ten factors is regulation, but at least two 
others also encompass aspects of regulation as the concept is construed in 
this paper; namely, trade policy, wages and prices (i.e., wage-price 
controls), and possibly government intervention in the economy (although 
this is interpreted as degree of government ownership, which is not a 
regulatory matter).71  The rankings rely on data from late 2004 to early 
 
 65. See id. at 214. 
 66. Id. at 456. 
 67. Id. at 28. 
 68. Id. at 29. 
 69. See generally MILES ET AL., supra note 10. 
 70. See id. at 56. 
 71. See id. 
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2005.72 
The approach taken entails no surveys; rather, the authors assign 
numerical scores (from one to five) to each of the ten factors, and a simple 
average is computed as the overall score for the rankings.73  For each of the 
factors, a set of criteria is specified to guide the scoring process, and the 
data used are identified.74  The process is a mix of judgmental and data-
determined considerations, depending on the indicator.  For example, the 
most favorable score achievable for the regulation factor is “1,” which 
indicates that, “[e]xisting regulations straightforward and applied uniformly 
to all businesses; regulations not much of a burden for business; corruption 
nearly nonexistent.”75  By contrast, a score of “5” indicates “[g]overnment-
set production quotas and some state planning; government regulations 
virtually impede creation of new businesses; corruption widespread; 
regulations applied randomly.”76 
Only three countries received scores of “1” on regulation: Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Denmark.77  Sixteen countries scored “5.”78  The United 
States’ score was “2,” as was Canada’s.79  As for trade policy and for 
wages and prices, both the United States and Canada scored “2.”80 
The overall rankings, incorporating all ten factors, place the following 
countries in the top five: Hong Kong, Singapore, Ireland, Luxembourg, and 
Iceland.81  At the bottom of the rankings are North Korea, Iran, Burma, 
Zimbabwe, and Venezuela.82  The United States ranked ninth and Canada 
ranked twelfth (although the two countries have virtually the same 
numerical score of 1.84 and 1.85, respectively).83 
The Index of Economic Freedom has the appealing feature of covering a 
large number of countries with clear criteria applied by a single set of 
analysts, as distinct from an opinion survey from business executives 
across the globe.  But it remains heavily judgmental and at a level of 
 
 72. See id. at 57. 
 73. Id. at 56-57. 
 74. Id. at 58-74. 
 75. Id. at 72. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 412-14. 
 78. Id. at 414.  These countries were Bosnia & Herzegovina, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, 
Sierra Leone, Bangladesh, Vietnam, the Republic of Congo, Haiti, Turkmenistan, Laos, 
Cuba, Libya, Zimbabwe, Burma, Iran, and North Korea.  Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 412. 
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abstraction that makes it difficult to discern particular obstacles or 
opportunities for government improvement.  Its greatest value is probably 
in drawing fairly clear lines between countries that have sharply differing 
burdens, as distinct from clarifying whether countries scoring a two or a 
three, for example, on any factor are actually and substantially dissimilar. 
5) Fraser Institute: Economic Freedom of the World Index84 
The Economic Freedom of the World Index, published by the Fraser 
Institute, is an annual series that ranks 127 countries on “the degree to 
which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic 
freedom.”85 The most recent ranking, issued in September 2005, reports on 
conditions prevailing in 2003.86  The report relies on thirty-eight indicators 
(fewer for some countries due to missing data) in constructing ratings for 
five areas: 
 
(1) “Size of Government Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises” (five 
“hard data” components)87 
(2) “Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights” (five judgmental 
components)88 
(3) “Access to Sound Money” (four “hard data” components) 89 
(4) “Freedom to Trade Internationally” (three of the nine components are 
regulatory indicators drawn from the Global Competitiveness Report’s 
survey)90 
(5) “Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business” (fifteen components, 
nine of which are survey-based indicators drawn from the Global 
Competitiveness Report)91 
 
The top five rankings in the most recent index went to Hong Kong, 
Singapore, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States.  Canada 
ranked seventh, with a score barely below that of the United States (8.0 and 
8.2, respectively, out of ten points).92  The bottom four included Myanmar, 
 
 84. JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., FRASER INST., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2005 
ANNUAL REPORT (2005). 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 6-8. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 12. 
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Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with 
Guinea-Bissau and Burundi tied for fifth-from-the-bottom rank.93  Table 2 
provides sub-rankings for Canada and the United States. 
TABLE 2:  FRASER INSTITUTE RANKINGS AMONG 127 NATIONS94 
 
 
 The regulatory burden components of the Fraser and World 
Economic Forum rankings overlap considerably.  The Fraser approach 
categorizes areas in ways that are more consistent with the regulatory 
structure outlined at the start of this paper, and it draws on a mix of hard 
statistical data and judgments about conditions.  There is a year greater 
delay in producing the annual Fraser rankings than in the other three annual 
series’ here reviewed. 
RANKINGS COMPARISON 
To aid in exploring similarities and differences among these ranking 
systems, Table 3 standardizes them by excluding those countries not ranked 
by all five studies.  The smallest array is that of the OECD (thirty 
countries), but one of the OECD countries, Luxembourg, is excluded from 
one of the larger studies.  Thus, Table 3 contains the rankings of twenty-
nine countries.  In other words, to promote comparability across rankings, 
if country X actually was ranked sixtieth in one of the larger studies, Table 
3 shows what happens to country X’s ranking in that study once all non-
OECD members and Luxembourg are deleted, pushing its rank up to, say, 
twenty-fifth out of the twenty-nine. 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Data for the United States and Canada can be found at GWARTNEY ET. AL, supra note 
84, at 14-16.  One is the most favorable ranking. 
CATEGORY U.S. CANADA 
Freedom to trade internationally 32 26 
Credit market regulations 9 19 
Labor market regulations 10 25 
Business regulations 12 15 
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Australia 1.5 19 14.5 6 7 
Austria 14 5 12.5 12 9.5 
Belgium 14 14 17 16 14.5 
Canada 8.5 3 10 8.5 5 
Czech Rep. 22 21 21 15 24 
Denmark 6 6 2.5 4 9.5 
Finland 10.5 11 2.5 8.5 12 
France 22 23 10 25 22.5 
Germany 14 15 5 13.5 13 
Greece 24 28 27 27 22.5 
Hungary 26 24 23 22 14.5 
Iceland 3.5 10 12.5 2.5 9.5 
Ireland 6 9 18.5 1 6 
Italy 25 26 25 24 25.5 
Japan 10.5 8 8 17 18.5 
Korea 17.5 17 16 26 21 
Mexico 27 27 28 28 27 
Netherlands 14 16 10 11 9.5 
New Zealand 6 1 18.5 6 2 
Norway 17.5 4 14.5 18.5 16.5 
Poland 29 25 26 23 28 
Portugal 19.5 22 22 18.5 20 
Slovak Rep. 14 20 24 21 25.5 
Spain 19.5 18 20 20 18.5 
Sweden 8.5 12 6 13.5 16.5 
Switzerland 22 13 4 10 2 
Turkey 28 29 29 29 29 
U.K. 1.5 7 7 2.5 4 
U.S. 3.5 2 1 6 2 
 
Note, in particular, from Table 3, the consistency among the top and 
 
 95. The author compiled this data based on the above-referenced reports.  See 
GWARTNEY ET. AL, supra note 84, at 14-16; LOPEZ-CLAROS ET AL., supra note 52, at 28-29; 
MILES ET AL., supra note 10, at 412-14; WORLD BANK, supra note 43, at 91-92; Conway et 
al., supra note 28, at 23. 
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bottom rankings.  For example, four countries—the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Canada—rank among the least burdened 
ten in all five studies.  At the other extreme, five countries—Italy, Greece, 
Poland, Mexico and Turkey—rank among the most burdened ten in all five 
studies.  Two countries—Mexico and Turkey—received virtually identical 
rankings in all five studies.  By contrast, the rankings of three countries—
New Zealand, Ireland and Australia—varied by as much as 17.5 ranks 
across the studies, showing substantial differences in their assessments. 
Table 4 shows overall how closely correlated the five ranking systems 
turn out to be  statistically.  The World Economic Forum rankings are 
somewhat more unique than are those of the other four studies.  The 
rankings of Heritage and Fraser are highly inter-correlated, as are those of 
OECD and Heritage. 
TABLE 4:  CORRELATIONS AMONG THE FIVE RANKING SYSTEMS96 
 OECD WORLD BANK 
WORLD 
ECONOMIC HERITAGE 





















FRASER 0.758 0.792 0.686 0.877 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
All of the country ranking systems reviewed in this paper are most 
useful in differentiating those countries in the least burdened group, for 
example, those in the twentieth or thirty-fifth percentile, from those at the 
other extreme, the most burdened countries.  Their ability to make finer 
distinctions among those in the middle group is limited by the narrowness 
of the differences in the scoring each relies upon. 
While each of the five ranking systems has its own unique appeal, there 
is greater commonality than distinction among them.  This finding is in 
accord with a review by Nicoletti and Pryor of three earlier (1997-98) 
 
96
 The author compiled these correlations.  Each correlation in Table 4 is statistically 
significant at the .001 level; that is, the odds of achieving these correlations by chance are 
less than one in a thousand. 
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rankings for OECD member countries, distinguishing those that primarily 
are driven by hard data from those that primarily rest on opinion surveys; 
Nicoletti and Pryor concluded that results of the three rankings were largely 
consistent: “overall perceptions of government regulations by business 
leaders and experts and the objective assessment of formal regulations 
appear to be relatively well aligned.”97 
The five ranking systems offer neither truly comprehensive pictures nor 
cost estimates of regulatory burden, but each taps much of what burdens 
private commerce.  Country-specific studies undertaken in the United 
States, Canada, and Australia that do attempt to estimate total regulatory 
costs generally put them in the neighborhood of ten percent of GDP.  For 
example, a report issued by the Government of Canada in October 2005 
cites studies suggesting that regulatory compliance costs approximately 
eight percent of GDP in the United States and twelve percent of GDP in 
Canada.98  A 2005 Australian study puts its regulatory burden at ten 
percent of GDP.99 
When such findings are considered in the context of multi-country 
rankings, it seems plausible to conclude that regulatory burdens in most of 
the rest of the world must absorb well over ten percent of GDP, given that 
the United States, Canada, and Australia consistently rank among the less-
burdened countries.  This in turn suggests that efforts to lessen regulatory 
burdens could have dramatic payback in improved economic performance 
worldwide.  Certainly, although varying in relative magnitude, regulatory 
compliance costs are large in most of the world.  The rankings surveyed in 
this paper suggest which parts of the world might be the most promising 
areas for regulatory burden reduction initiatives. 
 
 
 97. Giuseppe Nicoletti & Frederic Pryor, Subjective and Objective Measures of the 
Extent of Government Regulation,  J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. (forthcoming 2006). 
 98. Ndayisenga & Downs, supra note 3, at 9. 
 99. AUSTRALIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUS., supra note 6, at 14. 
